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Abstract
This study builds a North–South trade and growth model, and investigates the effect
of a change in each country’s income distribution on both countries’ economic growth.
The North is assumed to be a demand-led Kalecki-type economy in which the markup
pricing rule and the principle of effective demand prevail, while the South is a supply-
led Lewis-type economy in which surplus labor prevails and hence, the real wage is
fixed. Moreover, it is assumed that the markup rate of North firms is influenced by
international competition. The following four main results are obtained. First, in the
short-run equilibrium, an increase in the distributive shift parameter of the North in-
creases (decreases) the economic growth rate of the North if the North exhibits profit-
led (wage-led) growth. Such an increase in the distributive shift parameter of the North
also necessarily decreases the economic growth rate of the South. Second, in the short-
run equilibrium, an increase in the profit share of the South decreases (increases) the
economic growth rate of the North if the North exhibits profit-led (wage-led) growth.
Such an increase in the profit share of the South can either increase or decrease the
economic growth rate of the South. Third, in the long-run equilibrium, an increase in
the distributive shift parameter of the North decreases (increases) the economic growth
rates of the North and the South if the North exhibits wage-led (profit-led) growth in
the short-run equilibrium. Fourth, in the long-run equilibrium, an increase in the profit
share of the South increases (decreases) the economic growth rates of the North and the
South if the North exhibits wage-led (profit-led) growth in the short-run equilibrium.
∗Corresponding author. Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, Japan. E-mail:
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†Faculty of Economics, Saga University, Japan
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1 Introduction
In this study, we focus on the relationship between income distribution and economic growth.
The Kaleckian model, a type of demand-led growth model, is very useful for analyzing the
relationship between income distribution and economic growth, and there have been many
theoretical and empirical studies based on Kaleckian models.1) Many Kaleckian models are
closed economy models; however, it is important to analyze distribution and growth based
on open economy models, because globalization has progressed in the modern world. There
are two types of open economy models: small open economy models and two-country mod-
els. In small open economy models, it is assumed that the home country is small, the price
of goods is determined in the international market, and the home country has no impact
on the international economy. By contrast, in two-country models, it is assumed that large
countries trade with each other, economic policies in the home country have an impact on
the foreign country, and there is feedback from the foreign country to the home country. In
this study, to consider such feedback, we adopt a two-country model. There are two types
of assumptions in two-country models, namely, that two countries are symmetric and that
they are asymmetric. In this study, we analyze asymmetric countries, specifically, a devel-
oped country and a developing country. For this purpose, as a basic model, we extend Dutt
(2002), which focuses on the relationship between North–South trade and the economic
growth of each country, and build a model considering the effect of international competi-
tion ala Blecker (1989). Based on this model, we analyze the relationship between income
distribution and growth.
For an open economy Kaleckian model, we refer to Blecker (1989). Blecker (1989)
investigates a demand regime under both closed and open economies and shows that an
economy is likely to be a profit-led demand regime under an open economy in which in-
ternational price competition affects the economy even if is wage-led demand regime under
a closed economy. An increase in the wage share decreases the price competitiveness, and
accordingly, it negatively affects firms’ equipment investment. Therefore, it is unlikely that
a wage-led demand regime can be obtained under an open economy.
1) For representative theoretical studies based on Kaleckian models, refer to Cassetti (2003), Lima (2004),
Hein (2006), Lima and Meirelles (2007), Missaglia (2007), and Sasaki (2013). For empirical studies, refer to
Stockhammer and Onaran (2004), Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006), Naastepad and Storm (2007), Hein and
Vogel (2008), Onaran and Galanis (2013), and Rezai (2015a).
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Similar to the awareness of the problem that Blecker (1989) brings, Sasaki et al. (2013)
build a small open economy Kaleckian model. The main characteristic of their model is that
it endogenizes income distribution. Their results indicate that an increase in the bargaining
power of firms under an open economy can decrease the capacity utilization rate even if the
domestic demand regime exhibits profit-led demand, and that an increase in the bargaining
power of firms under an open economy can increase the capacity utilization rate even if the
domestic regime exhibits wage-led demand.
On the one hand, the abovementioned models are for a small open economy and there-
fore, cannot consider the feedback effect, such that a change in the income distribution of
a home country affects a foreign country, and in turn, its influence rebounds on the home
country. On the other hand, some studies build a two-country model and investigate how a
change in income distribution in the home country affects the output and growth rates of a
home country and a foreign country.
Dutt (1996) is based not on the Kaleckian model but on the classical growth model.
Nevertheless, it is an interesting study that analyzes the relationship between North–South
trade and economic growth. Dutt (1996) builds a model of North–South trade and economic
development, and analyzes the effect of technological change in a country on the growth
rates of both countries and the terms of trade. In this model, the real wage rates of both
countries are exogenously given, and the goods markets in both countries are competitive.
The North produces goods by inputting labor, capital, and material. North goods are in
demand as consumption and investment goods and are exported to the South. South goods
are produced by inputting labor and capital. South goods are in demand as consumption
and investment goods, and are exported to the North. In the long run, the terms of trade
are constant, and the economic growth rates of the two countries are equal. Although Dutt
(1996) does not analyze the relationship between income distribution and economic growth,
we can argue about it by using his model. On the one hand, when the North’s real wage
rate increases, the South’s terms of trade in the long run decrease, and the growth rates
of both countries decrease. On the other hand, when the South’s real wage rate increases,
the South’s terms of trade in the long run increases, and the growth rates of both countries
decrease. Therefore, an increase in the real wage rate in one country decreases the economic
growth rates of both countries in the long-run equilibrium. In this sense, we define both the
North and the South as exhibiting profit-led growth.
Nakatani (2012) and Von Arnim et al. (2014) present two-country Kaleckian models and
examine how an increase in the home country’s wage share affects the capacity utilization
rates of both countries.2) In these studies, two countries are modeled symmetrically, that is,
2) For a two-country Kaleckian model, see also Rezai (2015b). The author’s main finding is that national
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two countries are essentially identical with the same demand and production structures.
By contrast, Blecker (1996) builds a two-country, North–South model and considers
differences in demand and production structures of two countries. Specifically, the author
models a situation in which the North produces consumption-cum-investment goods and its
goods market is in imperfect competition, while the South produces consumption goods,
and its goods market is in perfect competition.
Sasaki (2019) extends Dutt’s (2002) model, which describes uneven development be-
tween the North and the South under North–South trade and investigates changes in income
distributions on both countries’ economic growth rates.3) In Sasaki’s (2019) analysis, to
capture both a wage-led growth regime and a profit-led growth regime, he uses a Marglin–
Bhaduri-type investment function instead of the Kalecki-type investment function that is
used in Dutt (2002). Sasaki’s (2019) analysis shows how a change in the profit share affects
both countries’ growth rates differently for the short- and long-run equilibria. For example,
in the short-run equilibrium, an increase in the North’s profit share causes the South’s terms
of trade to deteriorate and then the South’s growth rate to decrease. Meanwhile, in the long-
run equilibrium, an increase in the North’s profit share, through Thirlwall’s law (Thirlwall,
1979; 2012), either increases or decreases the South’s growth rate. Hence, the redistribution
of income toward workers in the North increases both countries’ growth rates if the North is
a wage-led regime in both the short and long run.
Like Sasaki (2019), we analyze the relationship between income distribution and eco-
nomic growth using the North–South trade model based on Dutt (2002). Dutt (2002) as-
sumes that both countries import goods for a portion of the consumption or investment, and
that the ratio of import goods depends on the relative price of domestic goods and import
goods. This assumption implies that there is international price competition between the
North’s goods and the South’s goods. However, in spite of this assumption, Dutt (2002)
assumes that the North’s firms always maintain a constant markup rate and do not consider
the effect of international price competition on firms’ pricing. Therefore, in this model, the
North’s economic growth rate does not depend on the terms of trade, and the change in
the South’s income distribution has no impact on the North’s economic growth rate. How-
ever, in a real international economy, it is natural to consider that firms determine the price
policies of demand management and redistribution can have unintended macroeconomic effects.
3) Porcile and Yajima (2019) extend Dutt’s (2002) model and build a model in which the North’s economic
growth rate is constant and the South exhibits a Kalecki-type economy. In their model, the South’s investment
function is a Marglin–Bhaduri type, and the South’s markup rate changes according to the difference between
the target profit share and real profit share. Spinola (2020) introduces a change in the technology gap between
the North and the South into Dutt’s (2002) model as well as wage bargaining in the South, and then analyzes a
model in which the following four variables are adjusted simultaneously: the terms of trade, the South’s profit
share, the South’s employment rate, and the technology gap between the North and the South.
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of goods based on international price competition to maintain the share of domestic goods
in the international market, and therefore, the assumption of the Dutt model is unrealistic.
Based on this discussion, in our model, we assume that the North’s markup rate depends
on the terms of trade. As a result, we can describe the mechanism by which the change in
income distribution and the economic growth rate in the South affect income distribution
and the economic growth rate in the North through the terms of trade.
From our analysis, we obtain the following results regarding the relationship between
income distribution and economic growth.
First, suppose that the distributive shift parameter of the North increases in the short-
run equilibrium. This change directly increases the profit share of the North. Then, it in-
creases the economic growth rate of the North if the North exhibits profit-led growth, while
it decreases the economic growth rate of the North if the North exhibits wage-led growth.
Moreover, the economic growth rate of the South unambiguously decreases.
Second, suppose that the profit share of the South, which is given exogenously, increases
in the short-run equilibrium. This change decreases the profit share of the North. Then, it
decreases the economic growth rate of the North if the North exhibits profit-led growth,
while it increases the economic growth rate of the North if the North exhibits wage-led
growth. Moreover, the economic growth rate of the South either increases or decreases.
Third, suppose that the distributive shift parameter of the North increases in the long-
run equilibrium. Then, it decreases the growth rates of both the North and the South in
the long-run equilibrium if the North exhibits wage-led growth in the short-run equilibrium.
Meanwhile, it increases the growth rates of both the North and the South in the long-run
equilibrium if the North exhibits profit-led growth in the short-run equilibrium.
Fourth, suppose that the profit share of the South increases in the long-run equilibrium.
Then, it increases the growth rates of both the North and the South in the long-run equi-
librium if the North exhibits wage-led growth in the short-run equilibrium. Meanwhile, it
decreases the growth rates of both the North and South in the long-run equilibrium if the
North exhibits profit-led growth in the short-run equilibrium.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure
of our model. Section 3 derives the short-run equilibrium and conducts stability analysis
and comparative static analysis in the short-run equilibrium. Section 4 derives the long-run
equilibrium and conducts stability analysis and comparative static analysis in the long-run
equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Model
North goods are produced by labor and capital stock. The production function takes the
following Leontief form:
YN = min{EN/bN , uNKN}, bN > 0, (1)
where YN denotes the output of the North goods, EN is employment, KN is capital stock, bN
is the labor input coefficient, and uN is the capacity utilization rate.
4)
South goods are produced by employment and capital stock. The production function
takes the following Leontief form:
YS = min{ES /bS ,KS /aS }, bS > 0, aS > 0, (2)
where YS denotes the output of the South goods, ES is employment, KS is capital stock, bS
is the labor input coefficient, and aS is the capital input coefficient.
The price of the North goods is determined by the unit labor costs multiplied by the
markup rate.
PN = (1 + z)WNbN , z > 0, (3)
where PN denotes the price, z is the markup rate, and WN is the nominal wage rate. The
markup rate and nominal wage rate are exogenously given.
Based on related studies by Blecker (1989), Nakatani (2012), Sasaki et al. (2013), and
Von Arnim et al. (2014), we assume that the markup rate of the North depends on the terms
of trade.
z = z(P; z¯),
∂z
∂P
> 0,
∂z
∂z¯
> 0, (4)
where P = PS /PN denotes the terms of trade, and z¯ denotes the distributive shift parameter
of the North. From equations (1) and (3), the profit share of the North is given by piN =
(PNYN − WNEN)/(PNYN) = z/(1 + z), which implies that piN is an increasing function of z.
Therefore, from equation (4), the profit share of the North is an increasing function of P and
4) Let the potential output be YF
N
. Then, the capacity utilization rate is given by uN = YN/Y
F
N
. Suppose that
the ratio of capital stock to potential output KN/Y
F
N
is constant. Then, the output–capital ratio YN/KN is a
proxy variable of the capacity utilization rate.
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an increasing function of z¯.
piN = piN(P; z¯),
∂piN
∂P
> 0,
∂piN
∂z¯
> 0. (5)
In our model, firms in the North determine the markup rate according to both interna-
tional and domestic factors.
First, equation (4) states that the international factor that determines the markup rate is
shown by the specification that the markup rate z is an increasing function of the terms of
trade P. Firms in the North determine the price considering international competition with
South goods. When the price of the South goods decreases relative to the price of the North
goods, firms in the North decrease the markup rate to maintain the share in the international
market. On the contrary, when the price of the South goods increases relative to the price
of the North goods, firms in the North increase the markup rate, because they can maintain
their share in the international market even if they raise the price of the North goods.
Second, equation (4) states that the domestic factor that determines the markup rate is
shown by the specification that the markup rate z is an increasing function of the distributive
shift parameter z¯. The distributive shift parameter z represents the relative bargaining power
between workers and firms in the North. It decreases when the relative bargaining power of
workers is strong, whereas it increases when the relative bargaining power of firms is strong.
We assume that the South’s real wage rate is constant and exogenously given.
WS
PS
= VS . (6)
With equation (6), the South’s profit share is given by
piS =
PSYS −WSES
PSYS
= 1 − bSVS . (7)
Because the labor input coefficient and the real wage rate are constant, the profit share is
also constant. When bS declines by technical progress or VS declines for some reason, the
South’s profit share increases.
Workers in the North spend all their wage income on consumption and, therefore, do not
save at all. Capitalists in the North spend a fraction sN of profit income on saving and the rest
1 − sN on consumption. Both workers and capitalists allocate a fraction α of consumption
expenditure to the purchase of the South goods and the rest 1 − α to the purchase of the
North goods. The fraction α is assumed to be
α = α0Y
εN−1
N
P1−µN , P =
PS
PN
, α0 > 0, εN > 0, µN > 0, (8)
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where α0 denotes a positive constant, P = PS /PN are the South’s terms of trade, εN is
the income elasticity of the North’s import demand, and µN is the price elasticity of the
North’s import demand. According to Dutt (2002), we assume that εN < 1, that is, the North
expenditure coefficient for South goods decreases as North income increases, which means
that the South goods are necessities.
Workers in the South spend all wage income on the purchase of South goods and there-
fore, do not save at all. South capitalists spend a fraction sS of profit income on saving, a
fraction β of the rest 1− sS of profit income on the purchase of the North goods, and the rest
1 − β on the purchase of South goods. The fraction β is assumed to be
β = β0(piSYS )
εS−1P1−µS , β0 > 0, εS > 0, µS > 0, (9)
where β0 denotes a positive constant, εS is the income elasticity of the South’s import de-
mand, and µS is the price elasticity of the South’s import demand. According to Dutt (2002),
we assume that εS > 1, that is, the South expenditure coefficient for the North goods in-
creases as South income increases, which means that the North goods are luxury goods.
Following Marglin and Bhaduri (1990), we assume that the capital investment function
in the North is an increasing function of the capacity utilization rate and profit share.
gN ≡
IN
KN
= γ0 + γ1uN + γ2piN , γ0 > 0, γ1 > 0, γ2 > 0, (10)
where IN denotes investment, and γi (i = 0, 1, 2) is a positive constant. In equation (10),
because the profit rate is equal to the product of the capacity utilization rate and profit share,
we assume that the capacity utilization rate and profit share differently affect firms’ planned
investments. Dutt (2002) assumes that the investment function is an increasing function of
the capacity utilization rate, which corresponds to the case of γ2 = 0 in equation (10).
The value of the North’s imports from the South is equal to the value of the South’s
exports to the North, which is given by
PSXS = α(1 − sNpiN)PNYN . (11)
From equation (11), the volume of the South’s exports is given by
XS = α0(1 − sNpiN)P
−µNY
εN
N
, (12)
The value of the South’s imports from the North is equal to that of the North’s exports
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to the South, which is given by
PNXN = βpiSPSYS . (13)
From equation (13), the volume of the North’s exports is given by
XN = β0pi
εS
S
PµSY
εS
S
. (14)
The excess demand for the South goods, EDS , is given by
EDS = CS S + IS S + XS − YS , (15)
whereCS S denotes the South consumption demand for the South goods; and IS S is the South
investment demand for the South goods. Because YS = CS S + IS S + MS and MS = XN/P
hold, equation (15) can be rewritten as
EDS = XS − (1/P)XN . (16)
The excess demand for North goods, EDN , is given by
EDN = CNN + IN + XN − YN , (17)
whereCNN denotes North consumption demand for North goods. Because YN = CNN+MN+
S N and MN = PXS hold, equation (17) can be rewritten as
EDN = IN − S N + XN − PXS . (18)
3 Short-run equilibrium
We define the short run as a situation in which both countries’ capital stocks KN and KS are
constant. The short-run equilibrium is achieved when EDS = 0 and EDN = 0. From our
assumption, the North’s saving is given by
S N = sNpiNYN . (19)
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Therefore, from equations (16) and (18), the terms of trade that establish EDS = 0 and the
capacity utilization rate that establishes EDN = 0 are given by
P∗ =
{
α0[1 − sNpiN(P
∗, z¯)]
β0pi
εS
S
[
γ0 + γ2piN(P
∗, z¯)
sNpiN(P∗, z¯) − γ1
· KN
]εN (KS
aS
)−εS} 1µN+µS −1
, (20)
uN =
γ0 + γ2piN(P, z¯)
sNpiN(P, z¯) − γ1
. (21)
respectively. Solving equation (20) with respect to P∗, we obtain the short-run equilibrium
terms of trade. Substituting it into equation (21), we obtain u∗N .
From our assumption, the South’s saving is given by
S S = sSpiSYS =
sSpiSKS
aS
. (22)
Since the South’s investment is composed of both the North and the South goods, we assume
that the South’s investment is given by
IS = P
ξS S , 0 < ξ < 1, (23)
where ξ denotes a parameter that captures the effect of a change in the terms of trade on
investment in the South. Substituting equation (22) into equation (23) and dividing the
resultant expression by KS , we obtain the South’s growth rate.
gS =
sSpiS
aS
Pξ. (24)
Therefore, the South’s growth rate is an increasing function of the terms of trade.
Using P∗, we obtain the capacity utilization rate of the North, the growth rate of the
North, and the growth rate of the South in the short-run equilibrium as follows:
u∗N =
γ0 + γ2piN(P
∗)
sNpiN(P∗) − γ1
, (25)
g∗N =
sN[γ0 + γ2piN(P
∗)]piN(P
∗)
sNpiN(P∗) − γ1
, (26)
g∗S =
sSpiS
aS
(P∗)ξ, (27)
respectively. Here, to prepare for the later analysis, we investigate the relationship between
the profit share of the North piN and the growth rate of the North gN . From equation (26), we
10
take the partial derivative of g∗N with respect to piN .
∂g∗N
∂piN
=
sN f (piN)
(sNpiN − γ1)2
, (28)
where
f (piN) = sNγ2
(
piN −
γ1
sN
)2
− γ0γ1 −
γ2γ
2
1
sN
, (29)
f (0) = −γ0γ1 < 0, (30)
f (1) = sNγ2 − 2γ1γ2 − γ0γ1. (31)
Here, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 1. In the short-run equilibrium, we define ∂g∗N/∂piN < 0 as wage-led growth in
the short-run equilibrium, whereas ∂g∗N/∂piN > 0 is profit-led growth.
With the Keynesian stability condition given by sNpiN − γ1 > 0, we should consider the
domain of the profit share piN ∈ (γ1/sN , 1). The sign of ∂g
∗
N/∂piN is equal to that of f (piN).
Hence, we should investigate the sign of f (piN).
When f (1) < 0, we always have f (piN) < 0 for piN ∈ (γ1/sN , 1). Therefore, when
f (1) < 0, the economy exhibits wage-led growth. On the other hand, when f (1) > 0, we
define pic
N
as the profit share such that f (pic
N
) = 0. Then, we have f (piN) < 0 for piN ∈
(γ1/sN , pi
c
N
) while f (piN) > 0 for piN ∈ (pi
c
N
, 1). Therefore, the economy exhibits wage-led
growth for piN ∈ (γ1/sN , pi
c
N
), but profit-led growth for piN ∈ (pi
c
N
, 1). In summary, we obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. When sNγ2 − 2γ1γ2 − γ0γ1 < 0, the North exhibits wage-led growth. When
sNγ2 − 2γ1γ2 − γ0γ1 > 0, the North exhibits wage-led growth for piN ∈ (γ1/sN , pi
c
N
), while it
exhibits profit-led growth for piN ∈ (pi
c
N
, 1).
3.1 Stability analysis of short-run equilibrium
In this subsection, we examine the stability of the short-run equilibrium. The system of
differential equations in the short run leads to
P˙ = ψ
{
α0[1 − sNpiN(P)]P
−µN (uNKN)
εN − β0pi
εS
S
PµS−1
(
KS
aS
)εS}
, (32)
u˙N = φ
[
γ0 + γ1uN + γ2piN(P) − sNpiN(P)uN −
P
ψ
·
P˙
KN
]
. (33)
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Each element of the Jacobian matrix J that corresponds to the system of differential equa-
tions (32) and (33) is given by
J11 =
∂P˙
∂P
= −ψα0(uNKN)
εNP−µN
{
sN
∂piN
∂P
+ (µN + µS − 1)[1 − sNpiN(P)]P
−1
}
, (34)
J12 =
∂P˙
∂uN
= ψ{εNα0[1 − sNpiN(P)]P
−µNu
εN−1
N
K
εN
N
} > 0, (35)
J21 =
∂u˙N
∂P
= φ
[
γ2
∂piN
∂P
− sNuN
∂piN
∂P
−
P
ψKN
· J11
]
, (36)
J22 =
∂u˙N
∂uN
= φ
[
γ1 − sNpiN(P) −
P
ψKN
· J12
]
< 0. (37)
Equations (34)–(37) are evaluated using the steady-state equilibrium values. The necessary
and sufficient conditions for the short-run equilibrium to be locally stable are that the trace of
J is negative (tr J < 0) and that the determinant of J is positive (det J > 0). If the Marshall–
Lerner condition (i.e., µN + µS > 1) is satisfied, we obtain J11 < 0. In this case, we obtain
tr J < 0. The determinant is given by
det J = φ
{
J11[γ1 − sNpiN(P)] − J12(γ2 − sNuN)
∂piN
∂P
}
. (38)
If the Keynesian stability condition sNpiN(P) − γ1 > 0 is satisfied and in addition, the con-
dition sNuN − γ2 > 0 is satisfied, we obtain det J > 0. The second condition means that
the effect of an increase in the profit share on saving is larger than the effect of an increase
in the profit share on investment. This condition is necessarily satisfied when the linear
Margin–Bhaduri investment function is imposed because
sNu
∗
N − γ2 = sN
γ0 + γ2piN(P
∗)
sNpiN(P∗) − γ1
− γ2 =
sNγ0 + γ1γ2
sNpiN(P∗) − γ1
> 0. (39)
From this analysis, we obtain the following proposition regarding the stability of the
short-run equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Suppose that both the Keynesian stability condition and the Marshall–Lerner
condition are satisfied. Then, the short-run equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable.
We show the phase diagram in Figure 1. From equations (32) and (33), the locus of
u˙N = 0 and that of P˙ = 0 are given by
u˙N = 0 =⇒uN =
γ0 + γ2piN(P)
sNpiN(P) − γ1
, (40)
12
P˙ = 0 =⇒uN =
β0pi
εS
S
(
KS
aS
)εS
α0K
εN
N
·
PµN+µS−1
1 − sNpiN(P)
. (41)
On the (P, uN) plane, the locus of u˙N = 0 is a downward-sloping curve and that of P˙ = 0 is
an upward-sloping curve. From this, the phase diagram is shown (see Figure 1). Therefore,
the short-run equilibrium is not only locally stable but also globally stable.
u
N
= 0

P = 0
O
P
u
N
P

u

N
S
0
E
Figure 1: Phase diagram in short-run period
3.2 Comparative static analysis of short-run equilibrium
In this subsection, we conduct a comparative static analysis by assuming that the short-run
equilibrium is stable.5) In the following, we totally differentiate equation (20) to investigate
how the two parameters z¯ and piS affect P
∗.
The effect of an increase in z¯ on the terms of trade P∗ is given by
dP∗
dz¯
=
ΩΘ
∂piN
∂z¯
1
P∗
−ΩΘ
∂piN
∂P
< 0. (42)
Here, the two parameters are defined as follows:
Ω ≡
1
µN + µS − 1
> 0, (43)
Θ ≡ −
sN
1 − sNpiN
−
εN(γ1γ2 + sNγ0)
(γ0 + γ2piN)(sNpiN − γ1)
< 0. (44)
5) For the comparative static analysis with respect to the real wage rate of the North, see the Appendix.
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The denominator and the numerator of equation (42) are positive and negative, respectively.
The effect of an increase in z¯ on the profit share of the North piN is given by
dpi∗N
dz¯
=
∂piN
∂z¯
·
1
1 −ΩΘP∗ ∂piN
∂P
> 0. (45)
Combining the above results with Proposition 1, we obtain the following results:
z¯ ↑=⇒ pi∗N ↑, u
∗
N ↓, g
∗
N ↑ or ↓, P
∗ ↓, g∗S ↓ (46)
The implications of the results of the comparative static analysis given by equation (46)
are as follows.
When the relative bargaining power of workers in the North decreases, firms in the North
raise the markup rate to increase their profits, and hence, the profit share of the North pi∗N
increases. A decrease in the wage share decreases the consumption demand in the North,
which lowers the capacity utilization rate u∗N . The decrease in the capacity utilization rate
decreases investment demand in the North, which has a negative effect on the economic
growth rate g∗N . However, if the positive effect of the increase in the profit share on invest-
ment demand is sufficiently large, the economic growth rate g∗N can increase. In addition,
the price of the North goods PN increases due to the increase in the markup rate, the price
of the South goods PS decreases because the decrease in the North’s consumption demand
decreases the value of imports from the South, and hence, the terms of trade P∗ decrease.
The deterioration in the terms of trade decreases the capital accumulation rate of the South,
and hence, lowers the economic growth rate of the South g∗S .
When the relative bargaining power of workers in the North increases and, hence, the
distributive shift parameter z¯ decreases, the opposite scenario to that just described holds.
Next, the effect of an increase in the profit share of the South is given by
dP∗
dpiS
= −
εS
piS
Ω
1
P∗
−ΩΘ
∂piN
∂P
< 0. (47)
From equation (27), the effect of an increase in the profit share of the South piS on the
growth rate of the South is given by
dg∗S
dpiS
=
sS
aS
(P∗)ξ−1 ·
1 −ΩξεS −ΩΘP
∗ ∂piN
∂P
1
P∗
−ΩΘ
∂piN
∂P
. (48)
When a change in the terms of trade does not affect the profit share of the North, that is,
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∂piN/∂P = 0, the sign of equation (48) is determined by the sign of the following equation.
1 −ΩξεS =
µN + µS − 1 − ξεS
µN + µS − 1
. (49)
If the Marshall–Lerner condition is satisfied, the denominator of equation (49) is positive,
but the numerator can be positive or negative.
On the contrary, when a change in the terms of trade affects the profit share of the North,
that is, ∂piN/∂P > 0, the sign of equation (48) is determined by the sign of the following
equation.
1 −ΩξεS −ΩΘP
∗ ∂piN
∂P
. (50)
Because the third term on the right-hand side of equation (50) is positive, equation (50) is
likely to be positive compared to equation (49), but it can be negative depending on the
conditions.
Combining the above results and Proposition 1, we obtain the following results:
piS ↑=⇒ pi
∗
N ↓, u
∗
N ↑, g
∗
N ↑ or ↓, P
∗ ↓, g∗S ↑ or ↓ (51)
The following explanation can be given for the effect of an increase in the profit share
of the South piS on the economic growth rate of the South g
∗
S when a change in the terms of
trade does not affect the profit share of the North.
On the one hand, an increase in the profit share of the South piS fosters capital accumula-
tion and hence, has a positive effect on the economic growth rate of the South. On the other
hand, an increase in the economic growth rate of the South increases the value of imports
from the North, which leads to an increase in the price of the North goods and a decrease in
the terms of trade P∗. The deterioration of the terms of trade has a negative effect on capital
accumulation, and hence, it offsets the abovementioned growth-enhancing effect. When the
absolute value of ξεS is sufficiently large (i.e., the positive effect of an increase in the South
income on the value of the South’s imports from the North is sufficiently large), then the
negative effect of the deterioration of the terms of trade dominates the positive effect of an
increase in the profit share. Consequently, the pace of capital accumulation decreases, which
lowers the economic growth rate of the South g∗S . In this case, the South exhibits wage-led
growth. On the contrary, when the absolute value of ξεS is sufficiently small (i.e., the pos-
itive effect of an increase in the South income on the value of the South’s imports from the
North is not so large), then the positive effect of an increase in the profit share dominates the
negative effect of the deterioration of the terms of trade. Hence, the economic growth rate
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of the South g∗S increases. In this case, the South exhibits profit-led growth.
Next, the implication for the result of the comparative static analysis when the terms of
trade affect the profit share of the North is as follows.
When the right-hand side of equation (49) is negative (i.e., even when the South exhibits
wage-led growth under the condition that the terms of trade do not affect the profit share
of the North), then the South can exhibit profit-led growth because the right-hand side of
equation (48) is positive if the absolute value of the third term on the right-hand side of
equation (50) is sufficiently large. This is because the markup rate of the North decreases
according to the terms of trade P∗, and hence, the profit share of the North piN decreases,
which increases the consumption demand of the North and imports from the South. When
the value of exports from the South to the North increases, the price of the South goods
increases, the terms of trade improve to some extent, and the negative effect of a decrease
in the terms of trade on capital accumulation of the South diminishes. The third term on the
right-hand side of equation (50) shows the opposite effect, such that the effect of this change
in the terms of trade on capital accumulation in the South occurs through the profit share
of the North. Then, if this effect is sufficiently large, the decrease in the economic growth
effect of the South through the deterioration of the terms of trade can be diminished.
We conduct a comparative static analysis with respect to the saving rate of the South sS .
To start, since sS does not appear in equation (20), which determines the short-run equilib-
rium terms of trade, sS does not affect P
∗. From this, sS does not affect pi
∗
N . Accordingly,
sS does not affect u
∗
N and g
∗
N . By contrast, sS appears in equation (27), which shows that g
∗
S ,
and hence, an increase in sS increases g
∗
S .
sS ↑=⇒ P
∗−, pi∗N−, u
∗
N−, g
∗
N−, g
∗
S ↑ (52)
These results can be explained as follows.
In the South, workers consume only domestic goods, and capitalists buy a constant frac-
tion of consumption goods and investment goods by importing from the South. Hence, a
change in the capitalists’ saving rate sS does not affect the value of imports from the North.
Accordingly, the terms of trade do not change and the profit share of the North pi∗N , the ca-
pacity utilization rate of the North u∗N , and the economic growth rate of the North g
∗
N do not
change. Meanwhile, in the South, an increase in the saving of the South directly increases
the investment in the South. Therefore, an increase in the saving rate sS necessarily increases
the economic growth rate of the South g∗S .
We conduct a comparative static analysis with respect to the saving rate of the North sN .
From equation (20), the effect of an increase in the saving rate of the North on the terms of
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trade in the South is as follows.
dP∗
dsN
= −
ΩΓpiN(P
∗)
1
P∗
−ΩΘ
∂piN
∂P
< 0, Γ =
1
1 − sNpiN(P∗)
+
εN
sNpiN(P∗) − γ1
> 0. (53)
An increase in sN decreases the South’s terms of trade, which decreases the economic growth
rate of the South. By assumption, a decrease in the South’s terms of trade decreases the profit
share of the North. Based on this result, from equation (25), the effect of an increase in the
saving rate of the North on the capacity utilization rate of the North is given by
d log u∗N
dsN
= −
piN(P
∗)
sNpiN(P∗) − γ1
−
γ1γ2 + sNγ0
[γ0 + γ2piN(P∗)][sNpiN(P∗) − γ1]
dpi∗N
dsN
⋛ 0. (54)
This can be positive or negative. In the closed economy Kaleckian model, an increase in the
saving rate decreases the capacity utilization rate. However, in the open economy Kaleckian
model, an increase in the saving rate can increase the capacity utilization rate. From equation
(26), the effect of an increase in the saving rate of the North on the economic growth rate of
the North is as follows.
d log g∗N
dsN
= −
γ1
sN[sNpiN(P∗) − γ1]
+
f (pi∗N)
Λ
dpi∗N
dsN
, (55)
where
Λ ≡ piN(γ0 + γ2piN)(sNpiN − γ1) > 0. (56)
When the short-run equilibrium exhibits profit-led growth, we have f (pi∗N) > 0, and hence,
equation (54) is negative. When the short-run equilibrium exhibits wage-led growth, we
have f (pi∗N) < 0, and hence, equation (54) can be positive or negative. When the North
exhibits profit-led growth, the paradox of thrift holds. When the North exhibits wage-led
growth, the opposite of the paradox of thrift holds.
sN ↑=⇒ P
∗ ↓, pi∗N ↓, u
∗
N ↑ or ↓, g
∗
N ↑ or ↓, g
∗
S ↓ (57)
The effect of an increase in the saving rate of the North on the equilibrium values can
be explained as follows. An increase in sN decreases consumption demand in the North and
hence, decreases the capacity utilization rate u∗N . The decrease in consumption decreases
the value of imports from the South, and hence, decreases the terms of trade P∗. This
deterioration of the terms of trade decreases the capital accumulation rate of the South,
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which lowers the economic growth rate of the South g∗S .
In the North, when the terms of trade P∗ decrease, firms in the North lower the markup
rate z, which decreases the profit share of the North pi∗N . When this decrease in pi
∗
N is suffi-
ciently large, even if sN increases, the consumption expenditure share of the North 1− sNpiN
increases, the consumption demand of the North increases, and hence, the capacity utiliza-
tion rate of the North u∗N increases. On the contrary, when this decrease in pi
∗
N is sufficiently
small, an increase in the saving rate of the North sN decreases the capacity utilization rate of
the North u∗N .
Next, we consider the effect of an increase in the saving rate sN on the economic growth
rate of the North g∗N . An increase in sN decreases consumption demand and investment de-
mand, which has a negative effect on capital accumulation. This negative effect is shown by
the first term on the right-hand side of equation (54). As stated above, since an increase in
the saving rate of the North sN decreases the profit share of the North pi
∗
N , it also has a neg-
ative effect on g∗N if the North exhibits profit-led growth in the short-run equilibrium. This
negative effect is shown by the second term on the right-hand side of equation (54). There-
fore, when the North exhibits profit-led growth in the short-run equilibrium, an increase in
the saving rate of the North sN necessarily decreases the economic growth rate of the North
g∗N . On the contrary, when the North exhibits wage-led growth in the short-run equilibrium
and, in addition, the negative effect of an increase in sN on the profit share of the North pi
∗
N is
sufficiently strong, then an increase in consumption demand increases the economic growth
rate of the North g∗N . In this case, the paradox of thrift does not hold.
From this analysis, the results of the comparative static analysis for the short-run equi-
librium are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Results of comparative statics
of the short-run equilibrium
P∗ pi∗N u
∗
N g
∗
N g
∗
S
z¯ − + − −† +‡ −
piS − − + +
† −‡ +/−
sN − − +/− +/−
† −‡ −
sS 0 0 0 0 +
† Short-run equilibrium exhibits a wage-led
growth regime.
‡ Short-run equilibrium exhibits a profit-led
growth regime.
Consequently, for the relationship between income distribution and growth in the short-
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run equilibrium, we obtain the following two propositions.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the distributive shift parameter of the North increases in the
short-run equilibrium. Then, it increases the economic growth rate of the North if the North
exhibits profit-led growth, while it decreases the growth rate of the North if the North exhibits
wage-led growth. Moreover, the economic growth rate of the South decreases.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the profit share of the South increases in the short-run equilib-
rium. Then, the profit share of the North decreases, which decreases the economic growth
rate of the North if the North exhibits profit-led growth, while it increases the economic
growth rate of the North if the North exhibits wage-led growth. Moreover, the economic
growth rate of the South either increases or decreases.
4 Long-run equilibrium
We define the long run as a situation in which the short-run equilibrium always holds and
capital accumulation in each country proceeds owing to capital investment. In other words,
KN and KS evolve in the long run. In this case, the short-run equilibrium value of the terms
of trade P∗ also evolves. We define a long-run equilibrium as a situation in which P˙∗ = 0.6)
The long-run equilibrium is a situation in which P˙∗ = 0 holds. Taking the natural log-
arithm of the short-run equilibrium condition given by equation (20) and differentiating the
resultant expression with respect to time, we obtain
P˙∗
P∗
=
1
µN + µS − 1

−sN
∂piN
∂P
1 − sNpiN(P∗)
P˙∗ + εN
 γ2
∂piN
∂P
γ0 + γ2piN(P∗)
P˙∗ −
sN
∂piN
∂P
sNpiN(P∗) − γ1
P˙∗
+
sN[γ0 + γ2piN(P
∗)]piN(P
∗)
sNpiN(P∗) − γ1
]
− εS
sSpiS
aS
(P∗)ξ
}
. (58)
Using P˙∗ = 0, we find that the long-run equilibrium terms of trade P∗∗ satisfy the following
equation:
εSgS (P
∗∗) − εNgN(P
∗∗) = 0. (59)
Specifically, from equations (26), (27), and (59), the long-run equilibrium terms of trade P∗∗
6) In many two-country growth models, as Dutt (2002) also states, the long-run equilibrium is assumed to
be a situation in which both countries grow at the same rate and the capital stock ratio KN/KS is constant.
However, in our model and that of Dutt, the terms of trade continue to decrease when both countries grow at
the same rate, and this situation cannot be the long-run equilibrium.
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satisfy the following equation:
P∗∗ =
{
εN
εS
·
aS
sSpiS
·
sN[γ0 + γ2piN(P
∗∗, z¯)]piN(P
∗∗, z¯)
sNpiN(P∗∗, z¯) − γ1
} 1
ξ
. (60)
From this, we find that in the long run, Thirlwall’s law holds as follows:
g∗∗S =
εN
εS
g∗∗N =⇒
g∗∗S
g∗∗
N
=
εN
εS
< 1. (61)
4.1 Stability analysis of long-run equilibrium
In this subsection, we examine the stability of the long-run equilibrium. Equation (58) can
be arranged as follows:
P˙ = Ω
B(P)
A(P)
, (62)
where
A(P) ≡
1
P
+ ΩεN
∂piN
∂P
γ1γ2 + sNγ0
[γ0 + γ2piN(P)][sNpiN(P) − γ1]
+ Ω
sN
∂piN
∂P
1 − sNpiN(P)
> 0, (63)
B(P) ≡ εNgN(P) − εSgS (P) = εN
sN[γ0 + γ2piN(P)]piN(P)
sNpiN(P) − γ1
− εS
sSpiS
aS
Pξ. (64)
The necessary and sufficient condition for the long-run equilibrium to be stable is that
the derivative of P˙ with respect to P is negative when it is evaluated at P = P∗∗. From
equation (62), we obtain
dP˙
dP
∣∣∣∣∣
P=P∗∗
= Ω
B′(P∗∗)A(P∗∗) − B(P∗∗)A′(P∗∗)
A(P∗∗)2
= Ω
B′(P∗∗)A(P∗∗)
A(P∗∗)2
= Ω
B′(P∗∗)
A(P∗∗)
, (65)
where we use the fact that at the long-run equilibrium, B(P∗∗) = 0 from equation (64). From
equation (63), we have A(P) > 0. Accordingly, if B′(P) < 0, the long-run equilibrium is
locally stable. From equation (64), B′(P) < 0 can be calculated as follows:
B′(P) = εN sN
f (piN(P))
∂piN
∂P
[sNpiN(P) − γ1]2
−
ξεS sSpiS
aS
Pξ−1. (66)
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When the short-run equilibrium exhibits wage-led growth, that is, f (piN) < 0, we obtain
B′(P) < 0. Therefore, the long-run equilibrium is locally stable.
When the short-run equilibrium exhibits profit-led growth, that is, f (piN) > 0, we have
B′(P) < 0 if the following condition holds.
εN sN
f (piN(P))
∂piN
∂P
[sNpiN(P) − γ1]2
<
ξεS sSpiS
aS
Pξ−1. (67)
Rearranging the condition given by equation (67), we obtain
ξ
P∗∗
−
f (piN(P
∗∗)) ∂piN
∂P
Λ
> 0. (68)
Accordingly, we obtain the following two propositions.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the short-run equilibrium exhibits wage-led growth. Then, the
long-run equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable.
Proposition 6. Suppose that the short-run equilibrium exhibits profit-led growth. Then, the
long-run equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable as long as ξ/P∗∗ > f (piN(P
∗∗)) ∂piN/∂P/Λ.
The implication for the long-run stability condition given by equation (68) can be ex-
plained as follows. When f (piN) < 0, that is, the North exhibits wage-led growth, the stabil-
ity condition always holds. This is explained by the following mechanism.
Suppose that the terms of trade P deviate from the long-run value P∗∗ for some reason.
Then, on the one hand, firms in the North lower the markup rate z, which decreases the
profit share of the North piN . Since the North exhibits wage-led growth, the economic growth
rate of the North gN increases, which increases the growth rate of consumption demand of
the North, increasing the growth rate of the value of the North’s imports from the South.
On the other hand, in the South, the decrease in the terms of trade P reduces the capital
accumulation rate, and hence, decreases the economic growth rate of the South gS . This
lowers the growth rate of the value of the South’s imports from the North. Since the value of
the South’s exports to the North increases and the value of the North’s exports to the South
decreases, the terms of trade P increase, and again, converge to the long-run equilibrium
P∗∗.
Suppose that the North exhibits profit-led growth when f (piN) > 0. Here, suppose that
the effect of a change in the terms of trade P on the economic growth rate of gN is larger than
the effect of a change in the terms of trade P on the economic growth rate of gS . In other
words, the investment elasticity with respect to the terms of trade ξ is small, and the effects
of the terms of trade on the economic growth rate of the North gN through z and piN (i.e.,
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f (piN(P
∗∗)) ∂piN/∂P) is sufficiently large. Then, we have ξ/P
∗∗ < f (piN(P
∗∗)) ∂piN/∂P/Λ, the
stability condition does not hold, and hence, the long-run equilibrium is unstable. This can
be explained as follows.
Suppose that the terms of trade P deviate from the long-run equilibrium value P∗∗ for
some reason. Then, firms in the North lower the markup rate, and hence, the profit share of
the North decreases. Since the North exhibits profit-led growth, the growth rate of the North
gN decreases, which lowers the growth rate of consumption demand of the North, decreasing
the growth rate of the value of the North’s imports from the South. On the other hand, in
the South, the decrease in the terms of trade P lowers the capital accumulation rate and the
economic growth rate gS , which decreases the growth rate of the value of the South’s imports
from the North. However, the extent of the decrease in imports is less than the extent of the
decrease in the growth rate of the value of the North’s imports from the South. As a result,
the terms of trade further decrease, and hence, it further deviates from P∗∗.
Even if the North exhibits profit-led growth, the long-run equilibrium is stable if the
effect of a change in the terms of trade on the economic growth rate gS dominates the ef-
fect of a change in the terms of trade on the economic growth rate gN , that is, ξ/P
∗∗ >
f (piN(P
∗∗)) ∂piN/∂P/Λ holds. This is because the economic growth rate of the South de-
creases more than the economic growth rate of the North when P decreases from P∗∗, and P
again converges to P∗∗ because the value of imports from the North to the South.
Figures 2 and 3 show the relationship between P∗ and the economic growth rate gi. The
horizontal and vertical axes correspond to the short-run equilibrium terms of trade and the
short-run equilibrium growth rate of each country, respectively. The growth rate of the South
is increasing in the terms of trade. The growth rate of the North is decreasing in the terms of
trade when the short-run equilibrium exhibits wage-led growth but increasing in the terms of
trade when the short-run equilibrium exhibits profit-led growth. Because εS > 1 and εN < 1,
the curve εSgS is located above the curve gS , whereas the curve εNgN is located below the
curve gN . The intersection of the curves εSgS and εNgN gives the long-run equilibrium.
From these figures, we observe that the long-run equilibrium is globally stable as well as
locally stable. Moreover, from these figures, we can observe that even if g∗S > g
∗
N holds in
the short run, g∗∗S < g
∗∗
N holds in the long run, and hence, the South cannot catch up with the
North in the long run.
4.2 Comparative static analysis of long-run equilibrium
We conduct a comparative static analysis by assuming that the long-run equilibrium is stable.
By totally differentiating equation (60), we investigate the effects of changes in the two
parameters z¯ and piS on P
∗∗.
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The effect of an increase in z¯ on P∗∗ is as follows:
dP∗∗
dz¯
=
f (piN )
Λ
·
∂piN
∂z¯
ξ
P∗∗
−
f (piN )
Λ
·
∂piN
∂P
. (69)
When f (piN) < 0, that is, the short-run equilibrium exhibits wage-led growth, the sign of
equation (69) is negative. When f (piN) > 0, that is, the short-run equilibrium exhibits profit-
led growth, the sign of equation (69) is positive.
The effect of an increase in z¯ on pi∗∗N is as follows:
dpi∗∗N
dz¯
=
∂piN
∂z¯

ξ
P∗∗
ξ
P∗∗
−
f (piN )
Λ
∂piN
∂P
 . (70)
When f (piN) < 0, that is, the short-run equilibrium exhibits wage-led growth, the sign of
equation (70) is positive. When f (piN) > 0, that is, the short-run equilibrium exhibits profit-
led growth, the sign of equation (70) is ambiguous.
The effect of an increase in the profit share of the South piS on P
∗∗ is as follows:
dP∗∗
dpiS
= −
1
piS
ξ
P∗∗
−
f (piN )
Λ
·
∂piN
∂P
. (71)
When the short-run equilibrium exhibits wage-led growth, the sign of equation (71) is neg-
ative.
From the above analysis, the results of the long-run comparative static analysis are as
follows.
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First, when the short-run equilibrium exhibits wage-led growth, the results are as follows.
z¯ ↑=⇒P∗∗ ↓, pi∗∗N ↑, u
∗∗
N ↓, g
∗∗
N ↓, g
∗∗
S ↓ (72)
piS ↑=⇒P
∗∗ ↓, pi∗∗N ↓, u
∗∗
N ↑, g
∗∗
N ↑, g
∗∗
S ↑ (73)
Second, when the short-run equilibrium exhibits profit-led growth, the results are as
follows.
z¯ ↑ =⇒ P∗∗ ↑, pi∗∗N ↑, u
∗∗
N ↓, g
∗∗
N ↑, g
∗∗
S ↑ (74)
piS ↑ =⇒ P
∗∗ ↓, pi∗∗N ↓, u
∗∗
N ↑, g
∗∗
N ↓, g
∗∗
S ↓ (75)
We investigate the effect of an increase in the distributive shift parameter z¯ on the long-
run equilibrium values.
The implications for the results given by equation (72) are as follows.
When z¯ increases, the price of the North goods PN increases, which lowers the terms of
trade P∗ in the short-run equilibrium. In this case, the profit share of the North pi∗N increases,
and hence the capacity utilization rate u∗N decreases, which decreases the economic growth
rate of the North g∗N when the short-run equilibrium exhibits wage-led growth. As a result,
the growth rate of the consumption of the North also decreases, and hence, the growth rate
of the value of the North’s imports from the South decreases too, which further reduces the
terms of trade P∗ in the long run. Therefore, when the short-run equilibrium exhibits wage-
led growth, an increase in the distributive shift parameter z¯ in the long run lowers the terms
of trade P∗∗, increases the profit share of the North pi∗∗N , decreases the capacity utilization
rate of the North u∗∗N , and decreases the economic growth rate of the North g
∗∗
N . In the same
case in the South, the capital accumulation decreases because of the decrease in the terms
of trade P∗∗. In addition, the growth rate of the South’s exports to the North decreases, and
consequently, the growth rate of the South g∗∗S decreases.
Next, we consider the case in which with respect to equation (74), the North exhibits
profit-led growth in the short-run equilibrium, and the denominator of the right-hand side of
equation (70) is positive (only this case satisfies the long-run stability condition when the
North exhibits profit-led growth). In this case, an increase in z¯ increases the profit share of
the North pi∗N , and hence, the capacity utilization rate of the North u
∗
N decreases. Since the
former positive effect on capital accumulation dominates the latter negative effect on capital
accumulation, the economic growth rate of the North g∗N increases, which leads to profit-led
growth. As a result, the growth rate of consumption demand of the North increases, and
hence, the growth rate of the value of the North’s imports from the South also increases,
which increases the long-run terms of trade P∗. Therefore, an increase in the distributive
24
shift parameter z¯ in the long-run equilibrium increases the terms of trade P∗∗, increases
the profit share of North pi∗∗N , decreases the capacity utilization rate of the North u
∗∗
N , and
increases the economic growth rate of the North g∗∗N . In the same case in the South, capital
accumulation accelerates due to the rise of the terms of trade P∗∗, and the growth rate of the
South’s exports to the North increases because of the increase in the economic growth rate
of the North, which consequently increases the economic growth rate of the South g∗∗S .
We investigate the effect of an increase in the profit share of the South due to an increase
in the labor productivity of the South arising from technological progress in the South.
As the comparative static analysis of the short-run equilibrium shows, an increase in the
profit share of the South piS accelerates capital accumulation and has a positive effect on the
economic growth rate of the South. However, an increase in the growth rate of the South
increases the value of the South’s imports from the North and decreases the terms of trade
P∗, which has a negative effect on capital accumulation and economic growth in the South.
Therefore, the effect of an increase in piS o economic growth is ambiguous. Meanwhile, in
the North, the decrease in the terms of trade P∗ decreases the markup rate of the North z,
and hence, the profit share of the North decreases. This increase in the wage share increases
consumption demand, which increases the capacity utilization rate u∗N .
Here, we consider the case in which the North exhibits wage-led growth in the short-
run equilibrium. The economic growth rate of the North g∗N increases due to the rise in the
wage share, which also increases the growth rate of the North’s consumption demand and
the South’s import demand. As a result, the price of the South goods PS increases, which
increases the terms of trade P∗ to some extent. An increase in the profit share of the South
piS has a direct positive effect on capital accumulation in the South. Although this positive
effect is offset by the deterioration in the terms of trade to some extent, the deterioration is
small because of an increase in the growth rate of consumption demand of the North, and in
the end, has a positive effect on capital accumulation in the South. Therefore, in this case, an
increase in the profit share of the South piS in the long-run equilibrium decreases the terms
of trade P∗∗, decreases the profit share of the North pi∗∗N , increases the capacity utilization
rate of the North u∗∗N , increases the economic growth rate of the North g
∗∗
N , and increases the
economic growth rate of the South g∗∗S .
We consider the case in which the North exhibits profit-led growth in the short-run equi-
librium and the denominator of the right-hand side of equation (70) is positive (only this
case satisfies the long-run stability condition when the North exhibits profit-led growth.).
In this case, the economic growth rate of North g∗N decreases because of the decrease
in the profit share pi∗N . From this, the growth rate of consumption demand of the North
and that of the North’s imports from the South also decreases; hence, the terms of trade P∗
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decrease in the long run. Therefore, in this case, an increase in the profit share of the South
piS in the long-run equilibrium decreases the terms of trade P
∗∗, decreases the profit share
of the North pi∗∗N , increases the capacity utilization rate of the North u
∗∗
N , and decreases the
economic growth rate of the North g∗∗N . In this case, capital accumulation decelerates due
to the deterioration of the terms of trade. Moreover, the decrease of the growth rate of the
North decreases the growth rate of the South’s exports to the North, which in turn decreases
the economic growth rate of the South g∗∗S .
We conduct a comparative static analysis with respect to the saving rate of the South sS .
Observing equation (60), which determines the long-run equilibrium terms of trade, we find
that sS appears in the same form as piS , which suggests that an increase in sS has exactly the
same effect as piS on the long-run equilibrium values. Therefore, we obtain the following
results.
First, when the short-run equilibrium exhibits wage-led growth, the results are as follows.
sS ↑=⇒P
∗∗ ↓, pi∗∗N ↓, u
∗∗
N ↑, g
∗∗
N ↑, g
∗∗
S ↑ (76)
Second, when the short-run equilibrium exhibits profit-led growth, the results are as
follows.
sS ↑ =⇒ P
∗∗ ↓, pi∗∗N ↓, u
∗∗
N ↑, g
∗∗
N ↓, g
∗∗
S ↓ (77)
The effects of an increase in the saving rate of the South sS on the long-run equilibrium
values can be explained as follows.
An increase in the saving rate of the South sS accelerates capital accumulation, and
hence has a positive effect on the economic growth rate of the North. However, an increase
in the growth rate of the South increases the value of the South’s imports from the North, and
causes the terms of trade P∗ to deteriorate, both of which have negative effects on capital
accumulation in the South. Therefore, the effect of an increase in the saving rate of the
South on the economic growth rate of the South is ambiguous. Meanwhile, in the North,
the decrease in the terms of trade P∗ decreases the markup rate z, and hence, the profit share
of the North pi∗N decreases. Then, the increase in the wage share increases the consumption
demand of the North, which increases the capacity utilization rate of the North u∗N .
With respect to equation (76), when the North exhibits wage-led growth in the short-run
equilibrium, an increase in the wage share increases the economic growth rate of the North
g∗N , which increases the growth rate of consumption demand and the growth rate of the
North’s import demand. However, in the South, although the deterioration of the terms of
trade has a negative effect on capital accumulation in the South, an increase in the growth rate
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of consumption demand of the North offsets this negative effect, and finally, the economic
growth rate of the South increases. Therefore, in this case, an increase in the saving rate
of the South sS decreases the terms of trade P
∗, decreases the profit share of the North pi∗∗N ,
increases the capacity utilization rate of the North u∗∗N , increases the economic growth rate
of the North g∗∗N , and increases the economic growth rate of the South g
∗∗
S .
With respect to equation (77), when the North exhibits profit-led growth and the long-run
equilibrium is stable, the economic growth rate of the North g∗N decreases due to a decrease
in pi∗N , which decreases the growth rates of the consumption demand of the North and the
North’s imports from the South, decreasing the terms of trade P∗. Therefore, in this case, an
increase in the saving rate of the South sS in the long-run equilibrium decreases the terms of
trade P∗∗, decreases the profit share of the North pi∗∗N , increases the capacity utilization rate
of the North u∗∗N , and decreases the economic growth rate of the North g
∗∗
N . In this case of the
South, capital accumulation decelerates due to the deterioration of the terms of trade P∗∗, the
growth rate of the South’s exports to the North decreases because the economic growth rate
of the North decreases, and in the end, the economic growth rate of the South g∗∗S decreases.
We conduct a comparative static analysis with respect to the saving rate of North sN .
dP∗∗
dsN
= −
γ1
sN (sNpiN−γ1)
ξ
P∗∗
−
f (piN )
∂piN
∂P
Λ
< 0. (78)
Using equation (78), we find that an increase in sN decreases the profit share of the North
through a decrease in P∗∗. The effect of an increase in the saving rate of the North on the
capacity utilization rate and the economic growth rate of the North can be analyzed in the
same way as the comparative static analysis of sN in the short-run equilibrium. Therefore,
an increase in sN either increases u
∗∗
N or decreases. In addition, an increase in sN the long-
run equilibrium g∗∗N when the short-run equilibrium exhibits profit-led growth, and hence,
decreases g∗∗S through Thirlwall’s law. When the short-run equilibrium exhibits wage-led
growth, g∗∗S increases if g
∗∗
N increases, while it decreases if g
∗∗
N decreases through Thirlwall’s
law.
sN ↑=⇒ P
∗∗ ↓, pi∗∗N ↓, u
∗∗
N ↑ or ↓, g
∗∗
N ↑ or ↓, g
∗∗
S ↑ or ↓ (79)
The effect of an increase in the saving rate of North sN on the long-run equilibrium values
can be explained as follows.
Similar to the short-run analysis, an increase in the saving rate of North sN decreases the
demand for North consumption, decreases the North’s imports from the South, and the terms
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of trade P∗∗ decreases, which lowers the markup rate of the North, leading to a decrease in
the profit share of the North pi∗∗N . If this decrease in pi
∗∗
N is sufficiently large, the capacity
utilization rate of the North u∗∗N increases although sN increases because the expenditure
share 1 − sNpiN increases, and hence, the consumption demand of the North increases. On
the contrary, if the decrease in pi∗∗N is sufficiently small, an increase in sN decreases u
∗∗
N .
When the North exhibits profit-led growth in the short-run equilibrium, an increase in
the saving rate of the North sN decreases both the economic growth rates of the North and
South. Therefore, in the long run, both countries’ growth rates are in equilibrium at a lower
level, and hence, both g∗∗N and g
∗∗
S decreases.
When the North exhibits wage-led growth in the short-run equilibrium, an increase in
the saving rate of the North sN increases the economic growth rate of the North g
∗
N , while
it decreases the economic growth rate of the South g∗S . If the income elasticity of imports
of the North εN is sufficiently large, and if the income elasticity of imports of the South εS
is sufficiently small, then the value of the South’s exports to the North increases at a higher
rate based on whether the consumption demand of the North increases at a higher rate, and
hence, the economic growth rate of the South also increases in the long run. In other words,
an increase in sN increases both g
∗∗
N and g
∗∗
S . On the contrary, if εN is sufficiently small and
if εS is sufficiently large, the value of the North’s exports to the South grows at a lower rate,
because the economic growth rate of the South slows down, which in turn decreases the
economic growth rate of the North in the long run. Therefore, an increase in sN increases
both g∗∗N and g
∗∗
S .
From the above analysis, the results of the long-run comparative static analysis are sum-
marized in Table 2.
Table 2: Results of comparative statics of the
long-run equilibrium
P∗∗ pi∗∗N u
∗∗
N g
∗∗
N g
∗∗
S
z¯ −† +‡ + − −† +‡ −† +‡
piS − − + +
† −‡ +† −‡
sN − − +/− +/−
† −‡ +/−† −‡
sS − − + +
† −‡ +† −‡
† Short-run equilibrium shows a wage-led growth
regime.
‡ Short-run equilibrium shows a profit-led growth
regime.
From the above analysis, we obtain the following two propositions regarding the rela-
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tionship between income distribution and economic growth in the long-run equilibrium.
Proposition 7. Suppose that the distributive shift parameter of the North increases in the
long-run equilibrium. Then, when the short-run equilibrium exhibits wage-led growth, the
growth rates of both the North and the South decrease. When the short-run equilibrium
exhibits profit-led growth, the growth rates of both the North and the South increase.
Proposition 8. Suppose that the profit share of the South increases in the long-run equilib-
rium. Then, when the short-run equilibrium exhibits wage-led growth, the growth rates of
both the North and the South increase. When the short-run equilibrium exhibits profit-led
growth, the growth rates of both the North and the South decrease.
5 Conclusions
In this study, we analyze the effect of an increase in the profit share of the North on the
economic growth rates of the North and the South and the effect of an increase in the profit
share of the South on the economic growth rates of the North and South in the short-run
equilibrium as well as the long-run equilibrium.
From our analyses, we obtain the following policy implications.
If the North exhibits wage-led growth (i.e., if the effect of the profit share of the North
on the investment of the North is small), an increase in the profit share by a decrease in
the workers’ wage bargaining power in the North decreases the capital accumulation rate
and the economic growth rate in the North through a decrease in the consumption demand.
Moreover, this change decreases the export demand from the South to the North and the
terms of trade, and as a result, the rate of capital accumulation also decreases. In other
words, when a developed country that exhibits wage-led growth carries out a policy that
weakens workers’ bargaining power (e.g., deregulation of the labor market), it may cause
low growth in both developed and developing countries through the lack of demand.
By contrast, if the North exhibits profit-led growth, an increase in the profit share by a
decrease in the workers’ wage bargaining power in the North increases the economic growth
rate of the North. Moreover, this change increases the economic growth rate of the South
through a change in the export demand from the South to the North in the long run. However,
even in this case, the economic growth rate of the South decreases with a decrease in the
terms of trade in the short run. It must be noted that high growth in developed countries is
achieved by forcing low-growth in developing countries temporarily, and that it may cause
conflict between the North and the South.
Meanwhile, an increase in the profit share of the South by an increase in labor productiv-
ity directly increases the capital accumulation rate of the South. Although this direct effect
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is offset by a decrease in the terms of trade through an increase in the import volume from
developed countries to some extent, if the developed countries exhibit wage-led growth, then
the economic growth rates of both developed and developing countries eventually increase,
because this change decreases the profit share and increases the consumption demand and
import demand in developed countries. In other words, a policy that promotes the produc-
tivity growth of developing countries (e.g., development assistance) has an advantage not
only for the developing countries but also for the developed countries.
By contrast, if the North exhibits profit-led growth, a policy that increases the workers’
real wage and decreases the profit share in the developing countries (e.g., improvements of
labor law) has a positive effect on the economic growth rates of both the developed countries
and the developing countries in the long run. Although a decrease in the profit share of
the South temporarily decreases the capital accumulation rate of the South, it is likely that
the firms in the developed countries are released from the restriction of international price
competition and secure sufficient profit owing to an increase in the relative price of goods of
the South. As a result, the high growth of the developed countries is achieved, and in turn,
the high growth of the developing countries is also achieved.
Appendix: Real wage rate of the North
In this Appendix, we investigate the change in income distribution on the real wage rate of
the North. Since workers in the North consume both the North goods and South goods, we
define the real wage rate of the North as follows: we divide the nominal wage rate of the
North by the consumer price index of the North.
VN =
WN
Pα
S
P1−α
N
=
1
Pα(1 + z)bN
(80)
=
1 − piN
PαbN
, α = α0(uNKN)
εN−1P1−µN . (81)
Using equation (81), we investigate the effect of an increase in z¯ or the profit share of the
South piS on the real wage rate of the North. We note that these parameters affect piN , P, and
α.
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Short-run equilibrium
The effect of an increase in z¯ on V∗N in the short-run equilibrium is given by
d logV∗N
dz¯
= −
1
1 − pi∗
N
·
dpi∗N
dz¯
−
α∗
P∗
[1 + (1 − µN) log P
∗]
dP∗
dz¯
− α∗(εN − 1)
1
u∗
N
·
du∗N
dz¯
log P∗ ⋛ 0.
(82)
Here, we assume that εN < 1 and µN < 1. The effect of a change in z¯ on the real wage rate in
the short-run equilibrium can be decomposed into its effect on the profit share of the North,
its effect on the terms of trade, and its effect on the North expenditure coefficient on the
South goods. In addition, because the logarithm of the terms of trade log P∗ takes either a
positive or a negative value based on whether P∗ is more than or less than unity, it is difficult
to obtain a definite answer.
If the effect of an increase in z¯ on α is negligibly small, then equation (82) leads to
d logV∗N
dz¯
= −
1
1 − pi∗
N
·
dpi∗N
dz¯
−
α∗
P∗
·
dP∗
dz¯
⋛ 0. (83)
From the short-run equilibrium analysis, we know that the effect of an increase in z¯ on the
profit share of the North is positive, and its effect on the terms of trade is negative. If the
former positive profit-share effect dominates the latter negative terms-of-trade effect, then
an increase in the distributive shift parameter of the North decreases the real wage rate of
the North. On the contrary, if the latter negative terms of trade dominate the former positive
profit-share effect, then an increase in the distributive shift parameter of the North increases
the real wage rate of the North.
The implications for the results given by equation (83) are as follows.
When the relative bargaining power of workers in the North decreases, firms in the North
raise the markup rate to maintain their profits, and hence, the price of North goods P∗N in-
creases. This puts downward pressure on the real wage rate of the North V∗N . Meanwhile,
since an increase in P∗N means a decrease in the terms of trade P
∗, the real price of import
goods from the South decreases, which puts upward pressure on V∗N . Therefore, if the ex-
penditure share of import goods for domestic consumption is sufficiently small, an increase
in the domestic price leads to a stronger effect than a decrease in the import price does, and
hence, the real wage rate of the North V∗N decreases. On the contrary, if the expenditure
share of import goods for domestic consumption is sufficiently large, the real wage rate of
the North V∗N increases.
The effect of an increase in the profit share of the South on the real wage rate of the
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North is given by
d logV∗N
dpiS
= −
1
1 − pi∗
N
·
dpi∗N
dpiS
−
α∗
P∗
·
dP∗
dpiS
> 0. (84)
From the short-run equilibrium analysis, the effect of an increase in the profit share of the
South on the profit share of the North is negative, and its effect on the terms of trade is
negative. Therefore, an increase in the profit share of the South increases the real wage rate
of the North.
The implications for the results given by equation (84) are as follows.
When technological progress increases the labor productivity of the South, and hence,
the profit share of the South piS increases, capital accumulation in the South accelerates;
hence, the value of the South’s imports from the North increases, which decreases the terms
of trade P∗. For workers in the North, this means a decrease in the real price of import
goods from the South. In addition, firms in the North decrease the markup rate according
to the decrease in the terms of trade P∗, and the domestic price of the North goods P∗N also
decreases. Therefore, since the price of North goods and that of South goods decrease, the
real wage rate of the North necessarily increases.
Long-run equilibirum
In the long run, as long as εN < 1, the expenditure coefficient α approaches zero based on
whether KN increases. As a result, since the terms-of-trade effect and the expenditure share
effect vanish, the effect of an increase in z¯ on the long-run equilibrium real wage rate of the
North is given by
d logV∗∗N
dz¯
= −
1
1 − pi∗∗
N
·
dpi∗∗N
dz¯
< 0. (85)
Therefore, an increase in z¯ decreases the real wage rate of the North.
In the long run, as the North grows, the North expenditure share of import goods for
domestic consumption decreases. For this reason, even if an increase in z¯ increases the real
wage rate of the North V∗N , the effect of the decrease in the real price of import goods from
the South vanishes, and hence, only the effect of the increase in the domestic price prevails.
Therefore, an increase in z¯ due to the decrease in the relative bargaining power of workers
necessarily decreases the long-run equilibrium real wage rate of the North V∗∗N .
The effect of an increase in the profit share of the South piS on the real wage rate of the
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North is given by
d logV∗∗N
dpiS
= −
1
1 − pi∗∗
N
·
dpi∗∗N
dpiS
> 0. (86)
Therefore, an increase in the profit share of the South increases the real wage rate of the
North.
An increase in the profit share of the South piS decreases both the terms of trade P
∗∗ and
the profit share of the North pi∗∗N in the long run. As a result, since the domestic price of the
North goods P∗∗N decreases, the real wage rate of the North V
∗∗
N necessarily increases.
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